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A Comparative Analysis o f the Policy Development Function
o f U.S. State Party Organizations
Joel Paddock, Southwest Missouri State University
Platforms provide a guide to a party's ideological location at a particular time. As such, they
can be a useful tool for comparing interparty and intraparty differences over policy alternatives at
the subnational level. This analysis of the recent platforms of 40 state Democratic parties and 34
state Republican parties, patterned after Ginsberg?s (1972. 1976) framework, revealed considerable
ideological decentralization (across-state intraparty differences) within both parties. Further analysis
of platform contents in relationship to Erikson. Wright, and M clver's (1993) research revealed weak
correlations between the ideological content o f platforms and the ideological orientations o f state
electorates, state elected officials, state party activists, and party identifiers, respectively.

Despite the fact that one of the most distinguishing features of the
American party system is its decentralization, surprisingly little research has
compared the public policy alternatives put forth by state party organiza
tions. Public policy development frequently is mentioned as a central func
tion of party organizations. We know very little, however, about the nature
and extent of policy differences among American state parties. There is an
extensive literature on the resurgence of state party organizations and their
organizational adaptation to a new style of electoral politics that suggests
that state parties have become more professionalized and active in recent
years (e.g., Cotter et al. 1984; Huckshorn et al. 1986). The policy develop
ment function of these organizations warrants further scholarly inquiry.
Traditionally, the central medium through which parties have presented
public policy alternatives to the voters has been the party platform, which
is "the principal official statement of party principles and policies" (Porter
and Johnson 1970, vi). Party platforms sometimes are belittled as meaning
less acts of political rhetoric that are rarely read and just as rarely followed
once the party candidates are in office.
Another perspective, however, suggests that while voters generally do
not read platforms, the content of the pledges usually reaches them through
less direct means and that once in office parties do a reasonably good job of
delivering on their pledges (Pomper 1967, 1968; David 1971; Monroe 1983;
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Budge and Hofferbert 1990). Party platforms, Pomper (1968, 203) writes,
"are a meaningful guide to party action." As the major statement of a
party’s principles and policies, they may indicate trends in the thinking of
at least some elements of the party, and changes in the intra-party balance
of power. Platform statements, Ginsberg (1972, 607) writes, "represent an
amalgamation and distillation of the principles, attitudes, appeals, and con
cerns of the party as a whole, or at least its dominant factions."
While platforms clearly do not reflect the attitudes of all of a party’s
activists, they provide a guide to a party’s ideological mainstream at a par
ticular time. As such, they can be a useful tool for scholars interested in
comparing inter-party and intra-party differences over policy alternatives at
the subnational level, a comparison that should be of theoretical concern.
Decentralized parties, it is argued, can accommodate a wide variety of inter
ests within the broader national party organizations. On the other hand,
a body of literature contends that party organizations have become more
nationalized, suggesting a reduction in intra-party policy differences and
greater cooperation between the component parts (national, state, and local
organizations) of the parties (Bibby 1979; Kayden 1980; Epstein 1982; Con
way 1983; Kayden and Mahe 1985; Wekkin 1984, 1985; Reichley 1985;
Frantzich 1986; Herrnson and Menefee-Libey 1990). Studying the content
of state party platforms can provide scholars with insights into the degree
of intra-party and inter-party policy heterogeneity or homogeneity. Are the
policy positions of state parties relatively homogeneous, or do their plat
forms reflect a broader spectrum of policy alternatives? Are state Demo
cratic and Republican platforms ideologically similar or distinct? What types
of states exhibit the highest levels of inter-party ideological differences? In
this paper a content analysis of state party platforms will be used to address
these questions.
Content Analyzing State Party Platforms
A 1992 national survey of state party organizations found that most
parties (40 Democratic, 34 Republican) had drafted a platform within the
past four years. Some parties draft the documents every two years; others
draft them every four years. State platforms are drafted in presidential elec
tion years, presidential mid-term election years, as well as odd-numbered
years. Although most platforms in this analysis came from 1992, a few date
to 1989, 1990, and 1991. The most recently drafted platform from each
state party was used (although no platforms prior to 1988 were considered).
A reading of a representative sample of platforms revealed that most
statements could be classified according to the general categories employed
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by Ginsberg (1972, 1976). Although Ginsberg’s analysis was of national
platforms, the categories are useful to the analysis of state platforms.
Because of their generality, the categories allowed a number of diverse statelevel policies to be coded and compared. The "Social Issue" was added to
Ginsberg s categories because of its particular relevance to contemporary
American politics.
The unit of analysis was the paragraph. The platforms were divided
into paragraphs and each paragraph was classifed on the basis of the pre
determined categories. Each paragraph could potentially receive one score
for each category, although because of the thematic nature of the platforms,
most paragraphs only fit in one or two categories. A five point scale was
developed for each category to measure the ideological orientations of the
platform statements. The five-point scale measures ideological direction and
the degree of policy specificity. A "1" is a stronger, more issue specific,
statement in a particular direction than a "2". Hence, the five point scale
should be viewed as a continuum on which "3" is a vague or neutral posi
tion. The further one moves from the center, the greater is the policy speci
ficity in a particular ideological direction. The following is a brief synopsis
of the seven major categories and the ideological scale for each category.
• Capitalism: The aggregation of wealth and control over the distribution of
wealth by the private sector.
(Scores of) 1 and 2 indicate commitment to the values of free enterprise
as a means of distributing benefits and burdens, and hostility to govern
ment intervention in the private economy;
(Scores of) 4 and 5 indicate orientation toward public sector action to
control the private sector’s aggregation of wealth.
• Redistribution: the reallocation of advantages in favor o f the disadvantaged.
1 and 2 indicate opposition to state policies redistributing advantages;
4 and 5 indicate advocacy of public sector action to redistribute advan
tages.
• Internal Sovereignty: the exercise o f the power and increase of the role of
the national government vis-a-vis the states and localities.
1 and 2 indicate opposition to federal intervention in state and local
affairs (a states’ rights orientation);
4 and 5 indicate support for a larger role for the national government
vis-a-vis the states and localities.
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• Labor: workers, organized labor, and policies regulating unions and the
workplace.
1 and 2 indicate negative orientation toward organized labor, opposi
tion to policies supported by unions (e.g., unemployment compensa
tion, worker safety), and/or support for policies opposed by unions
(e.g., right-to-work laws);
4 and 5 indicate positive orientation toward organized labor and poli
cies they support.
• Universalism: equality of rights and privileges for domestic minorities and
women.
1 and 2 indicate general opposition to public policies requiring private
and/or public agencies to alter their behavior for the purpose of pro
moting equal rights for minorities and/or women;
4 and 5 indicate support for policies promoting equality for minorities
and/or women.
•Social Issues: the use of the coercive power of the state to regulate private
behavior based upon traditional standards or the desire to promote
social order.
1 and 2 indicate support for preserving traditional values, standards of
behavior, and social order through the use of the state’s power;
4 and 5 indicate the promotion of free expression and social experimen
tation (e.g., right to protest, right of abortion, right to privacy) and
opposition to attempts to use the power o f the state to limit non
economic freedoms.
• Foreign/Defense: actions concerning relations with foreign objects and
national security policy.
1 and 2 indicate advocacy of the use of military force or the threat of
military force, rather than diplomacy, to achieve American interests in
the world;
4 and 5 indicate advocacy of the use of diplomacy, as opposed to mili
tary force, to achieve American objectives in the w orld.1
Because of the amount of subjective coding involved, care was taken
to ensure coder reliability. An in-depth discussion of the precise nature of
the categories, subcategories, and ideological scales was provided to the
coders, but has been condensed for this paper because of space limitations.
A comparison was made between the results of the two coders using a
random sample of 15 percent of the platforms. Inter-coder reliability scores
averaged .90 overall.
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Findings
The extent of inter-party policy differences can be measured in two
ways: differences over the relative emphasis each party gave to the general
policy areas, and ideological differences as measured by the five-point scale
in each policy area. Table 1 summarizes the relative emphasis each party
gave to the seven general categories. The figures are simply the percentages
of the total content of the platforms that were devoted to each of the issue
domains. The percentages do not add up to 100 percent because the plat
forms had statements that did not fit into any category.
The most obvious difference in the two parties’ agendas is their relative
emphasis on redistribution and the social issue. The Democratic state parties
mentioned redistributive issues almost twice as much as did Republican
organizations, while the Republican parties stressed social issues almost
twice as much as did the Democrats. Given the coalitional strategies of the
two parties, these differences are not surprising. The Democrats have relied,
in part, on a class-based coalition since the New Deal. Many redistributive
issues fit into this coalitional strategy. Likewise, many Republican organi
zations have courted the social right since the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The greater Republican preoccupation with the social issues is a likely re
flection of this coalitional strategy. Also not surprisingly, the Democrats
placed greater emphasis than the Republicans on labor and universalism;
labor unions, women, and minorities clearly have been important compon
ents of the Democratic coalition in recent decades.
Table 2 summarizes the aggregate mean ideology scores for both par
ties, and the inter-party ideological differences between the parties. In the
aggregate, clear ideological differences distinguish the parties in each o f the

Table 1. The Proportion of Platform Statements
Devoted to Each Category
Democrats
Capitalism
Redistribution
Internal Sovereignty
Labor
Universalism
Social Issue
Foreign Defense

38%
21
5
5
8
10
6

Republicans
39%
12
5
2
4
19
5
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Table 2. Aggregate Ideology Scores and
Inter-Party Ideological Differences

Capitalism
Redistribution
Internal Sovereignty
Labor
Universalism
Social Issue
Foreign/Defense
Overall

Democrats

Republicans

Difference

3.39
3.56
3.54
3.70
3.66
3.42
3.57
3.48

2.51
2.69
2.49
2.35
2.88
2.25
2.46
2.48

.88
.87
1.05
1.35
.78
1.17
1.11
1.00

seven categories. Democrats and Republicans differed the most on labor
issues and the least on universalism. The overall inter-party difference of
1.00 (on a five-point scale) hardly demonstrates ideological polarization, but
does show that the parties come from separate ideological "centers of grav
ity." These numbers suggest that, at least in the aggregate, the state parties
were not completely non-ideological organizations hugging the ideological
middle ground, nor were they ideologically polarized. Rather, it appears that
through different coalitional strategies and the accommodation of different
interests they reached their respective positions moderately to the left and
right of the center of the ideological continuum. Aggregate figures, how
ever, can be misleading. Some state party organizations might be ideo
logically polarized, while others might be centrist. It is necessary to examine
the data from the individual state parties.
Table 3 summarizes the overall average ideology scores for the forty
state Democratic parties and thirty-four Republican organizations. The thirty
states in which both parties drafted platforms are ranked on the basis of
inter-party ideological differences (the difference between the overall mean
Democratic and Republican ideology scores for each state). The mean ideol
ogy scores of the other state Democratic and Republican parties are listed
at the bottom of Table 3.
The aggregate figures in Tables 1 and 2 clearly mask the vast differ
ences within the two parties, as well as between the two parties in several
states. The range of overall ideology scores in each party is substantial
(Republicans 1.27, Democrats .94). Although there seems to be an ideo
logical "center of gravity" around the overall mean in each party, there
are significant differences between the parties’ two flanks. The most
liberal Democratic state parties (e.g. Washington, Minnesota, Maine, and
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Table 3. Mean Ideology Scores and Inter-Party Differences
for Democratic and Republican State Organizations
Democratic
Mean

Republican
Mean

Inter-Party
Difference

Washington
Oregon
Wisconsin
Iowa
Minnesota
Alaska
California
Texas
Oklahoma
Maine
Nevada
Montana
Idaho
North Carolina
Nebraska

4.01
3.79
3.90
3.83
4.01
3.52
3.56
3.48
3.29
3.92
3.52
3.61
3.50
3.57
3.57

2.05
2.06
2.25
2.19
2.35
2.06
2.12
2.17
1.99
2.64
2.30
2.40
2.31
2.51
2.56

1.96
1.73
1.65
1.64
1.57
1.46
1.44
1.31
1.30
1.28
1.22
1.21
1.19
1.06
1.01

Overall Mean

3.48

2.48

1 .0 0

Florida
Vermont
Wyoming
Missouri
Illinois
Utah
West Virginia
North Dakota
South Carolina
Indiana
Kansas
South Dakota
New Hampshire
New Jersey
Rhode Island

3.52
3.62
3.29
3.39
3.39
3.10
3.40
3.44
3.20
3.19
3.46
3.42
3.31
3.31
3.43

2.53
2.63
2.35
2.50
2.53
2.25
2.61
2.67
2.50
2.70
3.00
2.96
2.86
2.93
3.26

.99
.99
.94
.89
.86
.79
.77
.70
.49
.46
.46
.45
.38
.17

Overall ideology scores for states in which only one party drafted a platform: Demo
crats—Arizona 3.74, Massachusetts 3.71, Colorado 3.43, Michigan 3.38, Connecticut
3.35, New Mexico 3.31, Arkansas 3.30, Delaware 3.24, Mississippi 3.24, Georgia 3.07;
Republicans—Ohio 2.85, New York 2.58, Pennsylvania 2.45, Hawaii 2.31.
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Wisconsin) are clearly different than the more moderate organizations (e.g.
South Carolina, Indiana, Utah, and Georgia). Even more pronounced, the
conservative Republican state organizations (e.g. Oklahoma, Washington,
Alaska, and Oregon) are substantially different than the party’s moderate
organizations (e.g. Rhode Island, Kansas, South Dakota, and New Jersey).
Lacking longitudinal data, we cannot determine any movement toward or
away from ideological nationalization. However, the 1992 data do suggest
the existence of a significant amount of ideological decentralization in both
parties.
The degree of ideological decentralization in each party can be deter
mined by developing a measure of intra-party differences. The extent of
intra-party differences can be conceived of as the average amount of varia
tion around the mean of the state parties. Standard deviations were calcu
lated to determine what policy areas caused the greatest amount of intra
party ideological dispersion. Table 4 summarizes the standard deviation for
each issue. The standard deviations are based on the mean ideology scores.
Both parties experienced about the same level of intra-party differences.
The Republicans were most divided on labor issues and matters involving
the role of the federal government, while the Democrats had the greatest
disagreement on social and foreign policy issues. The relatively high Demo
cratic intra-party differences on the social issue were less the result of policy
disagreements than of policy emphasis. The more conservative parties on the
social issue emphasized criminal justice issues and largely ignored issues
such as abortion, alternative lifestyles, etc. The more liberal parties on the
social issue focused primarily on freedom of expression, right to privacy,
and lifestyle issues.

Table 4. Standard Deviations of the Seven Categories

Capitalism
Redistribution
Internal Sovereignty
Labor
Universalism
Social Issue
Foreign Defense
Overall

Democrats

Republicans

.25
.25
.37
.32
.36
.41
.39
.34

.31
.33
.41
.41
.39
.32
.37
.36
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It is notable that the most salient issues on the parties’ respective
agendas (capitalism and redistribution for the Democrats, capitalism and the
social issue for the Republicans) were the least divisive. None of the issues,
however, stands out as being particularly more divisive than the others. The
overall standard deviation figures do not suggest a great degree of intra
party differences. Similar data need to be gathered over an extended period
of time to determine changes in the relative intra-party differences over
time. Such data would be useful in addressing the broader theoretical issue
of party decentralization versus party nationalization.
Although the aggregate figures from Table 2 did not suggest ideological
polarization, the figures in Table 3 indicate that in some states inter-party
ideological differences were quite substantial. The states with the highest
inter-party differences run contrary to the traditional description of Ameri
can parties as non-ideological and centrist. It is interesting to note that the
top seven states in Table 3 (Washington, Oregon, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minne
sota, Alaska, and California) have similar traditions of issue-oriented party
activism, and, according to Daniel Elazar, predominantly moralistic subcul
tures (Elazar 1984; Mayhew 1986). Similarly, several of the states with the
lowest inter-party differences (e.g. Rhode Island, New Jersey, Indiana, West
Virginia) have traditions of patronage-oriented party organizations and
individualistic subcultures (Elazar 1984; Mayhew 1986).
One might speculate that in the states with traditions of issue-oriented
non-hierarchical party organizations, the party machinery was more easily
penetrated by "amateur," issue-oriented activists. In the states with traditions
of patronage-oriented party organizations, pragmatic, "professional" activists
were more likely to predominate in the formation of the party platform. A
major difficulty here is distinguishing between genuine amateur activism on
one hand, and parties responding to an ideologically polarized electorate on
the other. Did the Washington parties, for example, experience genuine
amateur activism, or were they merely responding to an electorate that was
more ideologically polarized than, for example, in Rhode Island?
Fully addressing this question will require a much more in-depth analy
sis of the platform-writing process in each of the states. We do not know
enough about how this process differs from state to state, or about the types
of party activists involved in writing platforms in different states to fully
understand why inter-party platform differences are greater in some states
than in others.
Although more work clearly needs to be done on the types o f activists
involved in writing platforms, and the relationship between platform content
and public opinion, a tentative analysis (using existing data sources) can be
made to assess the relationship between the ideological orientations of state
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platforms and the ideology of state electorates, party identifiers, party activ
ists, and elected officials. How strongly do the ideological orientations of
state party platforms correlate with state public opinion and the ideology of
state party identifiers, activists, and elected officials?
Erikson, Wright and M clver (1993) provide useful state-level measures
of the ideology of voters and party activists that can be compared with the
figures from Table 3. Using state-level CBS News-New York Times polls be
tween 1976 and 1988, they derived ideology measures for the overall state
electorate and for Democratic, Republican, and Independent identifiers in
forty-eight states. A measure of the attitudes of state elected officials in each
party was derived from CBS News-New York Times surveys of congressional
candidates between 1974 and 1982, as well as a 1974 survey of state legisla
tors carried out by Uslaner and Weber (1977). The ideology of state party
activists was measured by a 1980 survey of Republican national convention
delegates that was collected by Miller and Jennings (1987).
Table 5 summarizes the correlations between the ideological orienta
tions of the Republican and Democratic platforms and the ideological scores
of state electorates, Republican and Democratic identifiers, Republican and
Democratic elected officials and Republican and Democratic state party
activists (Erikson, Wright, and M clver 1993). The correlations for the Re
publicans are based only on the thirty-four states from which Republican
platforms were obtained (see Table 3). The correlations for the Democrats
are based only on the forty states from which Democratic platforms were
obtained (see Table 3). Nebraska and Nevada are not included in the corre
lations between state platforms and state party activists and elected office
holders; data on activists and elected officials from these states were not
obtained by Erikson, Wright and M clver (1993).
The figures in Table 5 show a weak relationship between state elec
torates and state party platforms in both parties. The ideological orientations
of Republican platforms weakly correlate with the ideological orientations
of Republican elected officials and state party activists. The ideological
orientation of Republican identifiers has the strongest correlation with
Republican platforms, but even this correlation is relatively weak. The
Democratic platforms more strongly correlate with the ideology of Demo
cratic elected officials and party activists. However, the Democratic plat
forms correlate less strongly with Democratic identifiers. Based on these
data, it appears that in many state parties public opinion was not a major
consideration in framing the party platform. In the Republican party it
appears that the activists who drafted the platforms were ideologically
different than the activists who served as county chairs and as national
convention delegates. There appears to be a closer relationship, however,

Policy Development in State Party Organizations

| 301

between Democratic party elites (county chairs and national convention
delegates) and the activists who drafted the state platforms.
The figures in Table 5 re-emphasize the point that the policy alterna
tives offered in state party platforms provide only one measure (among
potentially many) of the ideological orientations of state party organizations.
One also could measure state party ideology by surveying the attitudes of
party identifiers in the state electorate, local or state party committee mem
bers, national convention delegates, or elected officials from the state party.
The extent to which the policy alternatives offered in state party platforms
reflect the state party as a whole will remain unclear until we (1) gain a
better understanding of platform-formation processes in the states; (2) more
fully develop measures of the attitudes of state parties-in-the-electorate and
state party activists; and (3) more fully address the conceptual issue of who
or what constitutes a state party organization.

Table 5. Correlations Between the Ideological Orientations of
State Party Platforms and State Electorates, State Elected Officials,
State Party Activists, and State Party Identifiers
Republican
Platforms

Democrat
Platforms

.17
.27
.28
.44

.33

Electorate
Repub. Elected Officials
Repub. Activists
Repub. Identifiers
Demo Elected Officials
Democratic Activists
Democratic Identifiers

.53
.64
.25

Conclusion
The findings in this analysis are tentative. We have little understanding of
the process of platform construction in the American states. In some states
the platform may be a document on which the party’s gubernatorial nominee
runs his/her campaign. As such, the platform may be written by a small
number of individuals closely tied to the gubernatorial nominee. In other
states, the process may be open to a variety of party activists representing
different interests and factions within the party. Hence, we must be cautious
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in attributing certain characteristics of the party platform to the state party
as a whole.
In addition, figures from one election do not provide a longitudinal
perspective. In order to address the theoretical issue of growing ideological
nationalization, data from an extended time period must be compiled. Such
data could include not only content analyses of party platforms, but surveys
of party identifiers in the states and state party activists. Our understanding
of the ideological orientations of state party organizations (and even the
conceptual problem of identifying who represents or constitutes a state party
organization) is quite limited. Clearly, more scholarly work needs to be
done on the role played by state party organizations in defining the alterna
tives of public policy.

NOTE
'A s W ittkopf (1987) notes, foreign policy attitudes can be conceptualized by two, rather than
one dimension o f conflict: support for and opposition to cooperative internationalism, and support
for and opposition to militant internationalism. In order to maintain consistency with the other
categories in this analysis (which have one dimension o f conflict), the Foreign/Defense category
measures only the militant internationalism dimension. While this does not capture the depth of the
foreign policy debate, it allows for operational consistency with an issue that was not a major part
o f the state party platforms.

REFERENCES
Bibby, John F. 1979. Political Parties and Federalism: The Republican National Committee. Publius
9: 229-236.
Budge, Ian and Richard I. Hofferbert. 1990. M andates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party Platforms
and Federal Expenditures. American Political Science Review 84: 111-131.
Conway, M argaret. 1983. Republican Political Party Nationalization, Campaign Activities, and
Their Implications for the Party System. Publius 13: 1-17.
Cotter, Cornelius P., James I. Gibson, John F. Bibby, and Robert J. Huckshorn. 1984. Party Or
ganizations in American Politics. New York: Praeger.
David, Paul T. 1971. Party Platforms as National Plans. Public Administration Review 31: 303-315.
Elazar, Daniel J. 1984. American Federalism: A View From the States. New York: Harper and Row.
Epstein. Leon. 1982. Confederations and Party Nationalization. Publius 12: 67-102.
Erickson, Robert S., Gerald C. W right, Jr. and John P. M clver. 1989. Political Parties, Public
Opinion, and State Policy in the United States. American Political Science Review 83: 729750.
___________ . 1993. Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and Policy in the American States. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Frantzich, Stephen. 1986. Republicanizingthe Parties: The Rise o f the Service Vendor Party. Paper
presented at the 1986 Annual Meeting o f the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago,
April 10-12.

Policy Development in State Party Organizations

303

_

_

_

Ginsberg. Benjamin. 1972. Critical Elections and the Substance of Party Conflict: 1844-1968.
Midwest Journal o f Political Science 16: 603-626.
----------------- . 1976. Elections and Public Policy. American Political Science Review 70: 41-49.
Herrnson, Paul S., and David Menefee-Libey. 1990. The Dynamics o f Party Organizational
Strength. Midsouth Political Science Journal 11: 3-30.
Huckshorn, Robert J., James L. Gibson, Cornelius P. Cotter, and John F. Bibby. 1986. Party Inte
gration and Party Organizational Strength. Journal o f Politics 48: 976-991.
Kayden. Xandra. 1980. The Nationalizing o f the Party System. In Michael Malbin, ed., Parties,
Interest Groups and Campaign Finance Laws. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.
a nd Eddie M ahe, Jr. 1985. The Party Goes On. New York: Basic Books.
Mayhew, David. 1986. Placing Parties in American Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Miller, W arren E ., and M. Kent Jennings. 1987. Parties in Transition: A Longitudinal Study o f
Party Elites and Party Supporters. New York: Russell Sage.
Monroe. Alan D. 1983. American Party Platforms and Public Opinion. American Journal o f Polit
ical Science 27: 27-42.
Pomper, Gerald M. 1967. If Elected, I Promise: American Party Platforms. Midwest Journal o f
Political Science 29: 535-566.
• 1968. Elections in America. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company.
Porter, Kirk H. and Donald Bruce Johnson. 1970. National Party Platforms, 1840-1968. Urbana:
University o f Illinois Press.
Reichley, A. James. 1985. The Rise o f National Parties. In John Chubb and Paul Peterson, eds.,
The New Direction in American Politics. W ashington: The Brookings Institution.
Uslaner. Eric M. and Ronald E. W eber. 1977. Patterns o f Decision Making in State Legislatures.
New York: Praeger.
Wekkin, Gary D. 1984. National-State Party Relations: The D em ocrats’ New Federal Structure.
Political Science Quarterly 99: 45-72.
. 1985. Political Parties and Intergovernmental Relations in 1984: Consequences of
Party Renewal for Territorial Constituencies. Publius 15: 19-37.
Wittkopf, Eugene R. 1987. Elites and M asses: Another Look at Attitudes Towards Am erica’s World
Role. International Studies Quarterly 31:131-159.
Wright, Gerald C ., Jr., Robert S. Erikson, and John P. M clver. 1985. M easuring State Partisanship
and Ideology With Survey Data. Journal o f Politics 47: 469-489.

